Abstract

This User Manual gives instructions on how to implement and use the Security Tool of DA16200.
DA16200 Security Tool

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Terms and Definitions

CM  Chip Master
DCU  Debug Control Unit
DM  Device Master
CMPU  Chip Master Process Unit
DMPU  Device Master Process Unit
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer
RoT  Root of Trust
SB  Secure Boot
SD  Secure Debug

References

[1] DA16200, Datasheet, Dialog Semiconductor
1 DA16200 Security

1.1 Security Engine

DA16200 uses ARM CryptoCell-312 as its security engine that provides security services for the platform such as Secure Boot and Key Management with accelerating cryptography operations. The security services are mostly implemented into the ROM. And the cryptography and management service are integrated into the OS (Operating System) and used with mbedTLS for TLS and SSL protocols.

1.2 H/W Components

Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the DA16200 security engine.

![Block Diagram of DA16200 Security Engine](image-url)

The host processor is able to access CC312’s SRAM and registers, as well as the OTP (One Time Programmable) memory in DA16200. The CC312 security engine can initialize transactions with the system memory or other DMA slaves through the AHB (AMBA High-performance Bus) Master (Marked by ‘M’ in Figure 1).

The CC312 security engine is connected with the external OTP memory via the APB4 (Advanced Peripheral Bus) Master interface, and OTP memory holds the device root key (HUK), lifecycle state (LCS), et cetera as described further on in this section. The specific area of OTP memory that is
controlled by the CC312 security engine is inaccessible from outside of the CC312 acting as a Root of Trust.

The AO (Always On) module should survive a power down of the CC312 to keep the critical state in the embedding system. The AO (Always On) module includes the following components:

- Security lifecycle states (LCS)
- DCU (Debug Control Unit) and DCU Lock registers
- Lock-bits register

1.3 S/W Architecture

Secure Boot services are run on the ROM in DA16200. And the crypto services, which are accelerated by CC312 HW can be used with mbedTLS APIs. See the DA16200 SDK Programmer User Manual [2] for the mbedTLS APIs. Figure 2 shows the security software architecture in DA16200.

![Figure 2: DA16200 Security SW Architecture](image-url)
2 Security Features

2.1 Security Services

2.1.1 Secure Boot
The DA16200 provides a secure boot function that allows trusted images signed with a key matching the registration information in the system during the boot process to ensure the system's platform integrity. In the production step of the product it is necessary to register the key information for authentication in the OTP memory, which is protected by CC312.

2.1.2 Secure Debug
DA16200 supports a Secure Debug function that provides hardware protection of the debug port to prevent an external security attack. When a developer needs to enable this port for system debugging, Secure Debug uses the authenticated key with the signed debug certificate to remove the hardware protection, to allow debugging tasks.

2.1.3 Secure Asset
Secure Asset is a cryptographic service provided to protect data stored in external storage (Serial Flash memory). Data can be encrypted or decrypted with the provisioning key stored in the chip. Production-Line Provisioning is used to protect the data used in the mass production process, and Asset Provisioning is used to protect the data used during system operation.

2.2 Secret Keys
For the security feature in DA16200, several security keys are required and should be stored in OTP memory before production. This chapter describes the required security keys in DA16200. All secret keys are burned with the Security Tool. All hardware keys are accessed only by CryptoCell-312 and cannot be read by the CPU depending on the security life cycle state (LCS).

2.2.1 HUK (Device Key)
HUK (Hardware Unique Key) is a secret value that is burned in OTP memory, and is read by HW as part of the secure boot sequence and is no longer accessible for reading. HUK can only be used by the AES engine, and only for the derivation of other keys. It must be unique per device. For this uniqueness, it is generated as the seed value derived from TRNG in CC312. The SoC ID is derived from this key. A SoC ID is required in Secure Debug, which will be described further on. A SoC ID is only valid in the Secure LCS state. HUK will be generated by the Security Tool.

2.2.2 Platform Key (Krtl)
The Platform key (Krtl) is placed in DA16200 and used for provisioning during production lifecycle (CM and DM LCS). The Platform key (Krtl) will be provided by Dialog Semiconductor when requested. It is a 128-bit AES class key and a random 128-bit value. A key derived from this key is used to encrypt the provisioning assets such as Chip Master keys and Device Master keys, which are described in the following section. This key is only for use in CM (Chip Master) and DM (Device Master) LCS and is locked by HW in all other LCS. Krtl should not be exposed to others for any reason. Our Security Tool uses this key in Secure Production and will remove the key after use.
2.2.3 Chip Master (CM) Keys

CM keys are burned in OTP memory at production time and used as a back-up key for DM keys. The CM keys are generated in the Security Tool. There are two types of CM keys:

- CM Provisioning Key (Kpicv): The Kpicv is a 128-bit AES key used for an asset provisioning flow
- CM Encryption Key (Kceicv): The Kceicv is a 128-bit AES key used to encrypt or decrypt software images as part of the Secure Boot process. One of the images for the DA16200, the SLIB (System Library) image, can be encrypted with this key

2.2.4 Device Master (DM) Key

DM keys are burned in OTP memory at production time. They are generated in the Security Tool. There are two types of DM keys:

- DM Provisioning Key (Kcp): This is a 128-bit AES key that is used for asset provisioning
- DM Encryption Key (Kce): This 128-bit AES key is used to encrypt or decrypt SW images as part of the Secure Boot process. One of the images for the DA16200, the SLIB image, can be encrypted with this key

2.3 RoT

The Root-of-Trust (RoT) is a hash of the public key. Every public key has a corresponding private key and should be preserved and not exposed for security. The public and private key pair are generated in the Security Tool.

There are two RoT keys: Hbk0 and Hbk1. Hbk0 is a hash of the CM public key generated by the Security Tool and is a back-up RoT for Hbk1 (a hash of the DM public key), which is normally used for Secure Boot and Secure Debug. Both Hbk0 and Hbk1 should be burned to the OTP memory as RoT. Hbk0 and Hbk1 are used in order to validate the authentication of an image with certificate data.

Below is a summary for Hbk0 and Hbk1:

- Hbk0
  - A 128-bit truncated SHA-256 digest of a CM public key. Used as a back-up key for Hbk1, mainly used for Secure Boot and Secure Debug
- Hbk1
  - A 128-bit truncated SHA-256 digest of a DM public key. Used as a main RoT key
2.4 OTP Memory

OTP memory is used to store keys and configuration data. DA16200 has an 8 KB OTP memory. Mandatory configuration data must be burned in the offsets given in Table 1.

Table 1: Configuration Data & Key in OTP Memory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>32-bit word</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Write</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00-0x07</td>
<td>HUK</td>
<td>Readable in CM LCS</td>
<td>Writable in CM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0B</td>
<td>Kpicv</td>
<td>Readable in CM LCS</td>
<td>Writable in CM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0C-0x0F</td>
<td>Kceicv</td>
<td>Readable in CM LCS</td>
<td>Writable in CM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>CM programmed flags.</td>
<td>See the following table</td>
<td>Writable in CM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x11-0x18</td>
<td>RoT pubkey</td>
<td>Readable in all LCS</td>
<td>Writable in CM or DM LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If split into CM and DM keys: CM key(Hbk0): 0x11-0x14 DM key(Hbk1): 0x15-0x18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x19-0x1C</td>
<td>Kcp</td>
<td>Readable in CM LCS or DM LCS</td>
<td>Writable in DM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1D-0x20</td>
<td>Kce</td>
<td>Readable in CM or DM LCS</td>
<td>Writable in DM or RMA LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x21</td>
<td>DM programmed flags</td>
<td>See the following table</td>
<td>Writable in all LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x27</td>
<td>General purpose configuration flags</td>
<td></td>
<td>Writable in all LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x28-0x2B</td>
<td>DCU 128bits lock mask that allows S/W to lock the required debug bits</td>
<td>Readable in all LCS</td>
<td>Writable in CM or DM LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2C-0x7FF</td>
<td>Code and data sections that a user may use</td>
<td>Readable in all LCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1  The word area from 0x00 ~ 0x2B is not accessible by the CPU and is accessible only by the HW Security engine in DA16200.

The word area from 0x00 ~ 0x2B should be burned into OTP memory at production time. For this purpose, special images called CMPU and DMPU binary are required. CMPU is a binary image for HUK, Hbk0 and CM keys. DMPU is a binary image for Hbk1 and DM keys. CMPU and DMPU binary are generated by the Security Tool at Secure Production. This is described in the Security Tool chapter (3) in this document.

The following table shows the CM programmed flags that are located at address 0x10 in the OTP memory.

Table 2: CM-Programmed Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bits</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Read Access</th>
<th>Write Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[7:0]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in HUK.</td>
<td>Readable only in CM LCS; masked for reading in any other LCS</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[14:8]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Kpicv (128-bit).</td>
<td>Readable only in CM LCS.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[15]</td>
<td>Kpicv &quot;not in use&quot; bit. If Kpicv is not in use, this bit is set by the IFT.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bits</td>
<td>Usage</td>
<td>Read Access</td>
<td>Write Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[22:16]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Kceiv.</td>
<td>Readable only in CM LCS.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[23]</td>
<td>Kceiv &quot;not in use&quot; bit. If Kceiv is not in use, this bit should be set by the IFT.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[30:24]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Hbk0</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[31]</td>
<td>Hbk0 &quot;not in use&quot; bit. If Hbk0 is not in use, this bit should be set by the IFT.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following table shows the DM programmed flags that are located at address 0x21 in OTP memory.

**Table 3: DM-Programmed Flags**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bits</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Read Access</th>
<th>Write Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[7:0]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Hbk1 or Hbk.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in DM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[14:8]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Kcp (128-bit).</td>
<td>Readable only in CM LCS and DM LCS.</td>
<td>Writeable in DM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[15]</td>
<td>Kcp &quot;not in use&quot; bit. If Kcp is not in use, this bit should be set by the OFT.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in DM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[22:16]</td>
<td>Number of zero bits in Kce.</td>
<td>Readable only in CM LCS and DM LCS.</td>
<td>Writeable in DM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[23:23]</td>
<td>Kce &quot;not in use&quot; bit. If Kce is not in use, this bit should be set by the OFT.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in DM LCS and RMA LCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[31]</td>
<td>CM RMA LCS flag.</td>
<td>Readable in all security life-cycle states.</td>
<td>Writeable in CM LCS, DM LCS and Secure LCS, only if the CM RMA locking bit in the AO module is not set.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Life Cycle States (LCS)

There is a mechanism for managing the security Life Cycle State in DA16200. This mechanism enables the device to behave differently in each life cycle state, protecting any security assets once they have been introduced into the device and to reduce the risk of IP theft and reverse engineering. Figure 3 shows the LCS transitions:

![Life Cycle States (LCS) Transitions]

2.5.1 CM LCS

The device is in CM LCS if the following is true:

- CM-programmed flags: OTP word 0x10 = 0
- DM-programmed flags: OTP word 0x21 = 0

So, the default HW state is CM LCS. In this LCS, all debug interfaces (UART and JTAG) are enabled.

A CMPU package binary image that is generated with the Security Tool includes the following assets and should be burned into OTP in CM LCS:

- HUK: OTP word 0x00-0x07
- The number of zero bits in HUK: Bits[7:0] of OTP word 0x10
- Hbk0: OTP word 0x11-0x14
- The number of zero bits in Hbk0: Bits[30:24] of OTP word 0x10
- GPPC (General purpose configuration) flags, OTP word 0x27
- CM DCU locking if Hbk0 is used

Once these assets are burned, the device does a POR (Power On Reset) to transition to DM LCS.

2.5.2 DM LCS

The device is in DM LCS if the following is true:

- CM-programmed flags: OTP word 0x10 ≠ 0
DA16200 Security Tool

- DM programmed flags: Bits[7:0] of OTP word 0x21 = 0
  In this LCS, all debug interfaces (UART and JTAG) are still enabled.

A DMPU package binary image that is generated with Security Tool includes the following assets and it should be burned into OTP in DM LCS:

- Hbk1: OTP word 0x15-0x18
- The number of zero bits in Hbk1: Bits[7:0] of OTP word 0x21
- Optional: DM DCU locking if Hbk1 is used

Once these assets are burned, the device does a PoR to transition to Secure LCS

2.5.3 Secure LCS

The Deployed (Secure) LCS is used for devices out of the manufacturing line and in the field. It permits the execution of security functions but blocks all debugging and testing capabilities.

Use of Secure Boot is mandatory in this LCS. The device is in Secure LCS if the following is true:

- CM programmed flags: OTP word 0x10 ≠ 0
- DM programmed flags: Bits[7:0] of OTP word 0x21 ≠ 0

Secure LCS is the state changed with the DMPU process that will be described in section 3.2. And this is the state that should be applied at mass production when secure boot is required. Once in this state, the debug interface such as JTAG cannot be used anymore for security reasons. To enable the disabled debug interface, images with a Debug certificate should be used that will be described in section 3.4.

2.5.4 RMA LCS

The Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) LCS is a terminal state for devices that are returned to a Chip maker (i.e. Dialog Semiconductor) for analysis of fatal failures. When a device is put into RMA LCS, it loses its existing secret keys, but regains full access to all debugging and testing capabilities. All cryptographic engines are usable for test purposes, but the root keys change for each boot phase.

- HUK is replaced with a different random value with each boot cycle. Therefore, any previously-saved data that is protected by a key derived from HUK is lost
- Kce and Kceicv are invalidated so that Secure Boot can be used only in non-encrypted mode
- Kcp and Kpicv are invalidated, so that provisioning can no longer be done based on the previous values

There are two separate certificates needed to enter a device into RMA LCS - CM RMA and DM RMA. CM RMA is a certificate image with CM RoT (Hbk0) chain, and will remove CM keys in OTP.

DM RMA is a certificate image with DM RoT (Hbk1) chain, and will remove DM keys. Detailed process is described in section 3 Security Tool.
2.6 Boot Services

The boot services in DA16200 include the Secure Boot and Secure Debug certificate-based mechanisms that use an RSA private-public key scheme. Secure Boot and Secure Debug is based on the following elements:

- OTP secrets
  Provisioned to the device during the device manufacturing stage (CM LCS or DM LCS).
- ROM code
  A code library linked into the ROM of the device.
- RSA scheme verification
  Secure Boot and Secure Debug verification is done over a certificate chain that is two or three certificates long. Each certificate is signed and verified with an RSA PSS scheme (RSA 3072 Private-Public Key scheme and compliant to PKCS#1 Ver. 2.1, RSA-PSS).

2.6.1 Secure Boot

Secure Boot guarantees that only authenticated, and optionally encrypted, software images are loaded on a target system. A certificate is a message used to prove ownership of a public key. The certificate contains information about the public key, the authentication hash of the next key, and the signature that verifies contents.

The general structure of a certificate is as shown in Figure 4.

![Figure 4: General Structure of a Certification](image)

A signature is an encrypted piece of Certificate Data with a private key. Decryption is done with a public key in the Certificate Data. If Certificate Data is compromised for any reason, then the decrypted data from the Certificate Data would be different from that when Signature and certificate verification fails.

DA16200 uses a Certificate Chain for secure certificates verification.

A 3-level “self-signed” certificates chain is used, which are certificates signed with a private key and contain the corresponding public key inside.

The Secure Boot certificate chain is composed of key certificates and content certificates.

- Key certificates
  Mainly the 1st or 2nd certificate in the certificates chain.
- Content certificates
  The last certificate in a certificates chain, which is used to load and validate software components.

Figure 5 shows a 3-certificates chain.
Three-level SB certificate scheme
The three-level SB certificate chain order is: master key certificate → key certificate → content certificate.
Even if a key used in a 3rd or 2nd certificate is leaked, it can be replaced with another key if the private key used in the first certificate is not compromised.

2.6.2 Secure Boot Flow
To verify a certificate, the following steps are done in DA16200:

- Get the public key from the certificate and calculate its hash (HBK1, or HBK0)
- Verify the calculated hash:
  - If it is the first certificate in the chain, compare it with the hash value stored in the OTP
  - Otherwise, compare it with the saved hash from the previous certificate in the chain
- Verify the RSA signature with the public key of the certificate
- Save the public key hash of the next certificate, unless it is the last certificate in the chain

The entire certificates chain mentioned above is included in the built Image of DA16200. And it is impossible for an unauthorized image to boot because of the above verification process with this certificates chain.

Figure 7 shows the overall certificate-verification process.
Figure 7: Overall Certificate-Verification Process

Figure 8 shows the content-certificate process is done in a loop to process every SW image that is signed in the certificate.

The content certificate contains the following information for every image that must be verified:

- The address that the SW image is loaded to [load address]
- The flash address that the SW image is stored in [storage address]
- The size of the SW image
Get the hash of the SW image from the certificate

Verify the hash of the image?

Load the image to memory

Load SW image to memory

Load SW image to memory

Temporarily load SW image to RAM

Calculate hash

Compare the calculated hash to the certificate hash

Are the hashes the same?

Exit

Exit with error

LCS = Secure?

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Figure 8: Certification Contents in SW Images
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Figure 9 shows the structure of the built image of the DA16200. For secure boot the certificate chain scheme is described above, and the key and content certificate chain are included in the image of the DA16200.

Besides certificates, the following contents are included in the image of the DA16200.

- SFDP (Serial Flash Discoverable Parameters) information to control serial flash memory
- Debug certificate (optional)
- SW component (maximum of 3 components possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 level Debug Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved or Pad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Certification Contents in DA16200

CertA, CertB are key certificates, and CertC is a content certificate in Figure 9. Content can be a UEboot image, or an RTOS or SLIB binary built from our SDK.

- UEboot image (XXUEBOOTXX.img) built from our SDK contains a bootloader (UEboot) binary as SW component (Comp0)
- RTOS image (XXRTOSXX.img) built from our SDK includes an RTOS binary as a SW component (Comp0)
- SLIB image (XXSLIBXX.img) built from our SDK includes a ram library and TIM binary as SW components (Comp0 and Comp1 respectively)

All CertA, CertB and CertC are generated with the Security Tool and attached to each binary (UEboot, RTOS and SLIB binary) to make a bootable image for the DA16200.

- CertA and CertB are the same for all images while CertC is different for each image
- CertA with a Hbk1 (DM RoT) chain is generated with the name of "sboot_hbk1_3lvl_key_chain_issuer.bin" in the dmpublic directory in the Security Tool
- CertB with Hbk1 is generated with the name "sboot_hbk1_3lvl_key_chain_publisher.bin" in the dmpublic directory
- CertC is different from each image, because CertC contains the information of each image such as content and size as described before
- CertC for the UEboot binary is generated with the name "sboot_hbk1_ueboot_cert.bin" in the dmpublic directory
- CertC for the RTOS binary has the name "sboot_hbk1_cache_cert.bin"
2.6.3 Secure Debug

Secure Debug is a certificate-based mechanism that uses an RSA private-public key scheme. It enables secure debugging of the device.

Secure Debug supports the following operations:

- Does boot-time verification of debug certificates that enable authenticated debugging of secure domains. The secure domains are controlled by the DCU (Debug Control Unit) registers on the SoC
- Allows an authorizing party to shift the device into RMA LCS by using the same certificate mechanism (This is called "Secure RMA")

There is a 2-certificate chain in the debug certificate: an enabler certificate and a developer certificate. An enabler debug certificate can enable certain debug interfaces for a developer to debug a certain device. The developer enters SoC-ID of the target device to extend this to an actual debug certificate.

Figure 10 shows a three-level SD certificate scheme.

![Figure 10: Three-Level SD Certificate Scheme](image)

Note that the developer certificate can be generated with a SoC ID. If this does not match the target device, then the debug interfaces (JTAG and UART) will not be enabled. Once a debug certificate is verified during the boot sequence of the device, the permitted debug interfaces in the DCU mask of the enabler certificate will be enabled (UART0 and JTAG for DA16200) for the designated device of the SoC-ID in the developer certificate.

An enabler certificate has the following fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMA-mode</td>
<td>Mandatory if debug-mask is not defined. Cannot be defined together with debug-mask.</td>
<td>Defines whether to use this certificate for entry into RMA LCS, by setting to a non-zero value. Set when &quot;Secure RMA&quot; is run in the Security Tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debug-mask</td>
<td>Mandatory if RMA-mode is not defined. Cannot be defined together with RMA-mode.</td>
<td>The DCU mask allowed by the enabler. A 128-bit mask. Set when &quot;Secure Debug&quot; is run in the Security Tool.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A developer certificate has the following fields.

Table 5: Items in the Developer Certificate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SoC-ID</td>
<td>Mandatory.</td>
<td>SoC-ID of the device. You can enable debug interfaces of the device with this SoC-ID. If you try to enable the debug interface of the device with a different SoC-ID, it will fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debug-mask</td>
<td>Mandatory if RMA-mode is not defined. Cannot be defined together with RMA-mode.</td>
<td>The DCU mask allowed by the developer. A 128-bit mask.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A debug certificate is generated at Secure Debug in the Security Tool, which includes a debug-mask configuration in the enabler certificate and a SoC-ID for the developer certificate. An RMA certificate is generated at Secure RMA in the Security Tool, which includes an RMA-mode configuration in the enabler certificate and a SoC-ID for the developer certificate.
Device provisioning refers to burning secret keys and assets in the OTP memory of a device in a secure manner. The CM keys and assets in Table 6 should be burned in the OTP in CM LCS, and the DM keys and assets in Table 7 should be burned in the OTP in DM LCS.

### Table 6: CM Keys and Assets in CM LCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key names or Assets</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kpicv and Kceicv</td>
<td>CM key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hbk0</td>
<td>Root Of Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset</td>
<td>CM DCU lock bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset</td>
<td>Configuration bits (General Purpose Flag)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A CMPU (CM Provisioning Utility) package binary contains all of the above items and is generated when "Secure Production" is run in the Secure Tool.

### Table 7: DM Keys and Assets in DM LCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key names or Assets</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kcp and Kce</td>
<td>DM key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hbk1</td>
<td>Root Of Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset</td>
<td>DM DCU lock bits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the above secrets and asset are burned in the OTP memory, LCS automatically changes to Secure LCS. When LCS changes to Secure LCS, the JTAG debug interface in the DA16200 is disabled. In order to enable the JTAG debug interface again, the debug certificate scheme should be applied. The platform key (Krtl) is required to generate a CMPU and DMPU package binary to encrypt all assets as described in section 2.2.2.

### 2.8 Secure Asset

After device provisioning, secret keys in the OTP memory can be used to encrypt or decrypt user data in the flash memory. It provides APIs and procedures to encrypt and manage data to be stored in FLASH with the AES CCM method.

#### 2.8.1 API for Secure Assets

Secure assets are encrypted data stored in FLASH. Data decryption is done with the key derived from the provisioning key Kpicv or Kcp that is stored in the OTP memory. So, there is no risk of key disclosure.

The Security Tool supports the creation of the secure asset, encrypted with a key derived from the provisioning key.

The DA16200 SDK provides an API to decrypt assets with the key derived from the OTP memory keys by the HW Crypto engine.

The Secure Asset Service uses a CMAC algorithm based on AES encryption and has a file size restriction:
The valid size of unencrypted data must be multiplied by 16 bytes.
The maximum size of unencrypted data cannot exceed 512 bytes.
The maximum size of the secure asset is 560 bytes including the header size.

The decryption API provided by the SDK is FC9K_Secure_Asset(). See Table 8.

**Table 8: Secure Asset Runtime APIs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>extern UINT32 FC9K_Secure_Asset(</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32 Owner</td>
<td>Key type number. Use ‘1’ for Kpicv, or ‘2’ for Kcp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32 AssetID</td>
<td>ID information used in the encryption process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32 *InAssetData</td>
<td>Secure Asset Data. This data must be loaded into SRAM since this function does not access FLASH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32 AssetSize</td>
<td>Size of Secure Asset Data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT8 *OutAssetData</td>
<td>Decrypted Asset Data. This data must be allocated in SRFAM since this function does not run a memory allocation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Secure Asset is generated with "CM.4.secuasset.bat" in the folder SBOOT.

**Figure 11: The Encryption Process of Secure Asset**

Table 9 shows example code for decrypting a Secure Asset in FLASH.
### Table 9: Secure Asset Decryption Process

```c
UINT32  status;
UINT32 assetsiz, encassetsiz;
UINT8 *asset;
UINT8 *dump_encasset_hex = NULL;
UINT32 address;

dump_encasset_hex = APP_MALLOC((512+48)); // header + asset

address = htoi(argv[1]);
encassetsiz = htoi(argv[2]);

status = sbrom_sflash_read(address, dump_encasset_hex, encassetsiz);

if( status == TRUE ){
   资产 = CRYPTO_MALLOC(512);

    assetsiz = FC9K_Secure_Asset(2, 0x00112233, (UINT32 *)dump_encasset_hex, encassetsiz).

    if( assetsiz > 0 ){
        CRYPTO_DBG_DUMP(0, asset, assetsiz);
    }

    CRYPTO_FREE(asset);
}

PP_FREE(dump_encasset_hex);
```

#### 2.8.2 Secure Storage

The Secure Storage is a concept similar to the Secure Asset, but some features are different. Secure Storage is encrypted with a key derived from one of the following: user key, root key, Kcp or Kpicv. It also supports full services to encrypt raw data and decrypt secure data, but the Secure Asset only supports one way functions used to decrypt assets.

The following table shows the functions and related definition items for Secure Asset.

### Table 10: Secure Asset Runtime APIs

```c
typedef enum {
    ASSET_USER_KEY = 0,
    ASSET_ROOT_KEY = 1,
    ASSET_KCP_KEY = 2,
    ASSET_KPICV_KEY = 4,
} AssetKeyType_t;

typedef struct {
    UINT8  *pKey;
    size_t keySize;
} AssetUserKeyData_t;

typedef struct {
    uint32_t token;
    uint32_t version;
} AssetUserData_t;
```
● **AssetKeyType_t**

This defines the type of the derived key stored in the OTP to be applied to the key derivation function CMAC to be used for encryption. ASSET_ROOT_KEY means Huk, ASSET_KCP_KEY means Kcp, and ASSET_KPICV_KEY means Kpicv. If the user-defined key is used in addition to the key stored in OTP, it should be defined as ASSET_USER_KEY and KeyData should be set as input value.

● **AssetUserKeyData_t**

This is a structure to define a user-defined key when ASSET_USER_KEY is used. The user-defined key defines 128/192/256 bits, pKey defines the buffer pointer of Key Data, and keySize defines 16/24/32 Bytes, which means key length.

● **FC9K_Secure_Asset_RuntimePack()**

This function encrypts raw input data with an AES CCM method and has the following parameters:

- **KeyType**
  - Defines the type of decryption key to use for encryption.
- **Noncetype**
  - Defines how to generate the nonce information used in the encryption process. '0' is the Nonce generated by TRNG, and '0xFFFFFFFF' is the Nonce generated by PRNG.
- **KeyData**
  - This means the parameter to input User Key when KeyType is defined as ASSET_USER_KEY.
- **AssetID**
  - This is the ID information used in the encryption process.
- **Title**
This is a parameter to enter the title information of the Runtime Asset Package.

- **InAssetData**
  - This is the data pointer of the raw data to be encrypted.

- **AssetSize**
  - This is the size of the raw data and must be defined as 16 Bytes multiple for AES, which is a block cipher.

- **OutAssetPkgData**
  - This is the data pointer of the encrypted Runtime Asset Package. Since the function does not perform internal memory allocation, the data buffer for the output data should be pre-allocated and allocated to Raw Data Size + 48 bytes, considering 48 bytes of information field to be additionally tagged.

- If the Return Value is less than 0, it means error. If the Return Value is larger than 0, it means size information of output data OutAssetPkgData.

- **FC9K_Secure_Asset_RuntimeUnpack()**
  - This is a function to decrypt the encrypted input Runtime Asset Package, and the input parameter needs to input the encryption parameter applied to function FC9K_Secure_Asset_RuntimePack().

  - **KeyType**
    - This should match the type of decryption key used in encryption.

  - **KeyData**
    - If KeyType is defined as ASSET_USER_KEY, it should match key information used as User Key.

  - **AssetID**
    - This should match the ID information used for encryption.

  - **InAssetPkgData**
    - This is the data pointer of the Runtime Asset Package to be decoded.

  - **AssetPkgSize**
    - This is the size of the Runtime Asset Package, which means Raw Data Size + 48 bytes.

  - **OutAssetData**
    - This is the data pointer of the decoded raw data, and the size is the raw data size.

  - If the Return Value is less than 0, it means an error. If the Return Value is larger than 0, it means size information of output data OutAssetData.

Table 11 and Table 12 show example code to implement Secure Storage in FLASH that use the Runtime Pack / Unpack function.

**Table 11: Encryption Process**

```c
{
    UINT32  status;
    UINT32 assetid, assetoff;
    INT32  assetsiz, pkgsiz;
    UINT8  *assetbuf, *pkgbuf;

    assetid = htoi(argv[2]); // Asset ID
    assetoff = htoi(argv[3]); // FLASH Offset
    assetsiz = htoi(argv[4]); // plaintext, InAssetPkgData size
```
assetsiz = (((assetsiz + 15) >> 4) << 4);  // 16B aligned
PRINTF(" Aligned Asset Size:%d\n", pkgsiz);

assetbuf = APP_MALLOC(assetsiz);
pkgbuf = APP_MALLOC(assetsiz + 48);

if( assetbuf == NULL ){
    return;
}
if( pkgbuf == NULL ){
    APP_FREE(assetbuf);
    return;
}

// Step 1. Read Raw Data from FLASH
pkgsiz = 0;
status = sbrom_sflash_read( assetoff, assetbuf, assetsiz);

// Step 2. AES Encryption
if( status > 0 ){
    pkgsiz = FC9K_Secure_Asset_RuntimePack(ASSET_ROOT_KEY,
        NULL, assetid, "RunPack",
        assetbuf, assetsiz, pkgbuf );
}

// Step 3. Write Runtime Package Data to FLASH
if( pkgsiz > 0 ){
    PRINTF("PKG Size:%d\n", pkgsiz);
    sbrom_sflash_write(assetoff, pkgbuf, pkgsiz);
}

APP_FREE(pkgbuf);
APP_FREE(assetbuf);

Table 12: Decryption Process

```c
{  
  UINT32  status;
  AssetInfoData_t AssetInfoData;
  UINT32 assetid, assetoff, flagwrite;
  INT32  assetsiz, pkgsiz;
  UINT8  *assetbuf, *pkgbuf;

  assetid = htoi(argv[2]);  // Asset ID
  assetoff = htoi(argv[3]);  // FLASH Offset
  flagwrite = htoi(argv[4]);  // Test only, flash write option flag

  // Step 1. Read Info Block of Runtime Asset Package
  status = sbrom_sflash_read(assetoff,
      (UINT8 *)&AssetInfoData, sizeof(AssetInfoData_t));
  if( status == 0 ){
      PRINTF("SFLASH Read Error:%x\n", assetoff);
      return;
  }
```
if((AssetInfoData.token == CC_RUNASSET_PROV_TOKEN)
  && (AssetInfoData.version == CC_RUNASSET_PROV_VERSION))
{
    assetsiz = AssetInfoData.assetSize;
    PRINTF("Stored PKG Size:%d\n", assetsiz);
    pkgsiz = assetsiz + 48;
} else {
    PRINTF("Illegal Asset Package:%X.%X\n",
            AssetInfoData.token, AssetInfoData.version);
    return;
}

assetbuf = APP_MALLOC(assetsiz);
pkgbuf = APP_MALLOC(pkgsiz);

if( assetbuf == NULL ){
    return;
}

if( pkgbuf == NULL ){
    APP_FREE(assetbuf);
    return;
}

// Step 2. Read Runtime Asset Package form FLASH
assetsiz = 0;
status = sbrom_sflash_read(assetoff, pkgbuf, pkgsiz);

// Step 3. AES Decryption
if( status > 0 ){
    assetsiz = FC9K_Secure_Asset_RuntimeUnpack(ASSET_ROOT_KEY,
                                                NULL, assetid, pkgbuf, pkgsiz, assetbuf);
}

if( assetsiz > 0 ){
    PRINTF("ASSET:%d\n", assetsiz);
    CRYPTO_DBG_DUMP(0, assetbuf, assetsiz);

    // Step 4. Test only. Write Raw Data to FLASH
    if( flagwrite == 1 ){
        sbrom_sflash_write(assetoff, assetbuf, assetsiz);
    } else {
        PRINTF("ASSET:decryption error (%x)\n", assetsiz);
    }
}

APP_FREE(pkgbuf);
APP_FREE(assetbuf);

2.8.3 Secure NVRAM

The contents in NVRAM can be encrypted with the above runtime APIs for security. Huk, Kpicv, and Kcp in the OTP are used in Secure NVRAM.

When the NVRAM APIs are used, which are described in SDK Programmer Guide document, the user can read and write certain items in the NVRAM area on the flash memory.
When Secure NVRAM is enabled by the following commands, the items to write to the flash will be encrypted before writing, and the items to read will be decrypted when reading from the flash internally.

```
[DA16200] nvram.nvedit secure 1      // Key selection: 1 HUK, 2 Kpicv, 4 Kcp
[DA16200] nvram.nvedit save sflash    // Activates Secure NVRAM. Henceforth, encryption and decryption will be performed internally whenever read or write to the NVRAM occurs.
```

### Cryptographic Acceleration

MbedTLS APIs are used for cryptographic functions in DA16200. MbedTLS is an open source SSL library that enables developers to include cryptographic and SSL/TLS capabilities in their embedded products, with a minimal coding footprint.

You can choose between HW-accelerated cryptographic operations and the SW cryptographic implementation of Mbed TLS for each feature supported by both Mbed TLS and CryptoCell-312:

- The Mbed TLS cryptographic implementation provides an interface to the standard cryptographic operations. For example, AES, RSA or ECC
- The dedicated CryptoCell-312 APIs provide an interface to the non-standard or specific CryptoCell-312 operations. For example, key derivation using HUK

Mbed TLS and CryptoCell-312 are flexible in terms of which features are compiled in each. To control which components are Mbed TLS-based or CryptoCell-312-based, you must edit the config-cc312.h configuration file. This file is located in crypto/inc/mbedtls/config.h. It includes all the flags that are supported by Mbed TLS, with the additional XXX_ALT definitions. These XXX_ALT definitions are for the components that are accelerated by the HW.

By default, Dialog's SDK comes with the minimal required features that CryptoCell-312 accelerates. See the DA16X00 SDK Programmer Guide [2] on how to use mbedTLS APIs. Table 13 shows the supported HW acceleration crypto algorithms in DA16200.

#### Table 13: HW Acceleration Crypto Algorithms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Key Sizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>ECB, CBC, CTR, OFB, CMAC, CBC-MAC, AES-CCM, AES-CCM*, AES-GCM</td>
<td>128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES key wrapping</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chacha and Chacha-Poly1305</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-hellman</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1024 bits, 2048 bits and 3072 bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC key generation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NIST curves and 25519 curves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NIST curves and 25519 curves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NIST curves and ED25519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NIST curves and 25519 curves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>SHA1, SHA224 and SHA256</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKDF</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC</td>
<td>SHA1, SHA224 and SHA256</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>CMAC or HMAC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST SP 800-108: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA PKCS#1 operations</td>
<td>Encryption and signature schemes</td>
<td>2048 bits, 3072 bits and 4096 bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA key generation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2048 bits and 3072 bits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3  Security Tool

The Security Tool is provided to generate secret keys, certificates, and secure binary images for the DA16200. There are four major things users can do with the Security Tool:

- Generate RoT (Hbk0, Hbk1), CM/DM secret keys (Kpicv, Kceicv, Kcp, and Kce). It also generates CMPU and DMPU binary which contain all keys to be burned into OTP memory.
- Build Secure Boot images (secure bootloader, RTOS and SLIB Images) that run on DA16200.
- Generate Secure Debug certificates and images.
- Generate RMA certificates and image.

Figure 12 shows the top window of the Security Tool when running "CM.1.secuman.bat" at SBOOT directory in our SDK.

![Figure 12: Top Window of the Security Tool](image-url)
3.1 Role Selection

There are 3 roles to be selected before use:

- **Single manager**

  "Single" is a top manager who is responsible to generate and manage all secret keys of the product. Only the Single Manager has the authority to generate, renew or remove the secret keys. Most importantly, the private key that corresponds to the RoT (Hbk0 and Hbk1) in the OTP memory should be kept and maintained by the Single Manager.

  The Single Manager has the responsibility to keep the private key to himself and not expose the private key for any reason. If exposed for any reason, the product that has the corresponding RoT in the OTP should be recalled, because there is no use of the security for that product any more. For this reason, be extra careful when a user takes on the role of "Single" manager.

- **SB Publisher**

  The "SB Publisher" role has to generate the third certificate, i.e. the content certificate, which is needed for Secure Boot in a three-level certificate scheme and to rebuild Secure bootable images with it (all Uboot, RTOS, and SLIB images).

  Only the Secure Boot menu is enabled for this role. The main responsibility of this role is to remove the debug certificate in the image after Secure Debug. A debug certificate is in place in the images after running Secure Debug. An image with a debug certificate will enable debug interfaces. Use this role to remove the debug certificate and build only Secure Boot images that disable debug interfaces for security.

- **SB/SD Publisher**

  The "SB/SD Publisher" role has to generate the third certificate, i.e. the content certificate, which is needed for Secure Boot in a three-level certificate scheme and to rebuild Secure Boot images with it (all Uboot, RTOS, and SLIB images).

  In addition, the "SB/SD Publisher" role has to generate the Debug certificate for Secure Debug with the SoC-ID of the target device enabling the debug interface (JTAG port) of the target device and to rebuild Secure bootable images (only the Uboot image is rebuilt).

  Only Secure Boot and Secure Debug menus are enabled for the SB/SD Publisher role. See Figure 13.
When Secure Debug is selected, a window is shown that requests the Soc-ID of the target device. See Figure 14.

Figure 14: Request the Soc-ID in Secure Debug

The SoC-ID of the target device can be checked with the following console command:

- `[DA16200] sys.socid`

Copy the soc-id that you get with the above-mentioned command to the SoC-ID field in the Security Tool window. Note that SoC-ID is only valid when the target device is in Secure LCS. The SB/SD Publisher role is useful when the user wants to make their third party (or developer) debug the end-product in the field and not expose secrets. The third party can make a secure bootable image with this role and debug the product.
3.2 Secure Production

Secure Production generates all the secret keys such as CM keys, DM keys, and keys for the 2nd certificate and 3rd certificate. And the certificate chains that use the generated keys are generated to make a Secure Boot and Secure Debug image.

The following table shows which files are generated when Secure Production is used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>CM/DM keys</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Generated Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM keys</td>
<td>CM keys</td>
<td>cmsecret</td>
<td>OTP keys: cmkey_pair.pem, kceicv.bin, kpicv.bin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM keys</td>
<td>DM keys</td>
<td>dmsecret</td>
<td>OTP keys: dmkey_pair.pem, kce.bin, Kcp.bin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificates for Secure Boot</td>
<td>with CM keys</td>
<td>cmpublic</td>
<td>sboot_hbk0_3lvl_key_chain_issuer.bin, sboot_hbk0_3lvl_key_chain_publisher.bin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with DM keys</td>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>sboot_hbk1_3lvl_key_chain_issuer.bin, sboot_hbk1_3lvl_key-chain_publisher.bin, and content certificates for UEboot, RTOS and SLIB images.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificates for Secure Debug</td>
<td>with CM keys</td>
<td>cmpublic</td>
<td>sdebug_hbk0_3lvl_key_chain_enabler.bin, sdebug_hbk0_3lvl_key_chain_developer.bin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with DM keys</td>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>sdebug_hbk1_3lvl_key_chain_enabler.bin, sdebug_hbk1_developer_pkg.bin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To enter CM and DM secret keys into OTP memory, special binaries called CMPU package and DMPU package are also generated after Secure Production.

- CMPU package binary contains the items in Table 14
- DMPU package binary contains the items in Table 14
DA16200 Security Tool

Note that “Krtl.key” (the platform key) should be in place in directory cmsecret beforehand in order to run Secure Production. If there is no proper platform key in directory cmsecret, Secure Production will not run. The platform key will be provided by Dialog Semiconductor upon request.

After successful Secure Production, the platform key will be deleted by the Security Tool for security concerns. The platform key should not be exposed for any reason.

When the Secure Production button is clicked on the Security Tool, the below shown confirmation window appears to prevent that the user removes the files by mistake.

![Figure 15: Prevent Accidental Removal of Secret Keys in Secure Production](image)

When the Security Tool is used for the first time, select Yes to All. The Secure Production process starts logging on both the console window and the log file in the example directory.

The log messages for Secure Production are saved in file secure_production.txt in the example directory. The procedure or error messages can be checked with this file.

Be careful when it is not first time that the Security Tool is used and you want to select Yes to All. Because in this case the previously generated secret keys and certificates will be lost and regenerated from scratch.

After successful Secure Production, files cmpu.pkg.bin and dmpu.pkg.bin are in the public directory. At production time, these package binaries should be downloaded to Sflash memory at the address shown in Table 15.

| Table 15: CMPU/DMPU download address in Sflash |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Binary          | Start Address   |
| Cmpu.pkg.bin    | 0x001F_2000     |
| Dmpu.pkg.bin    | 0x001F_3000     |

Note that the addresses above are the default address in our SDK, and can change under user’s conditions. And UEboot for the production version should be used at production time.

There are three UEboot binaries provided in the image directory and the user must use one of them for the respective purposes.

| Table 16: UEboot Binary Definition of Secure boot, None Secure Boot and RMA |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| UEboot binary name | Purpose          |
| DA16xxx_ueboot.bin.SecureBoot | Production version UEboot |
| DA16xxx_ueboot.bin.NoneSecure | Normal version UEboot |
| DA16xxx_ueboot.bin.RMA | RMA version UEboot |

Before the SDK is built, one of three UEboot binaries should be renamed to DA16xxx_ueboot.bin to build a bootable UEboot image (DA16xxx_ueboot_xxx.img). After the SDK is built, a bootable UEboot image is available in the public directory.
For the CMPU and DMPU process, all UEboot, RTOS and SLIB images should be downloaded to SFlash beforehand.

To download the UEboot image, run the following command at the MROM prompt and select the production version UEboot image.

- [MROM] loady boot

Next, download the RTOS and SLIB images.

- [MROM] loady a000  // for RTOS image
- [MROM] loady f1000  // for SLIB image
- Power OFF and ON
- [DA16200] reset  // to enter into MROM

To download the CMPU binary, run the next command at the MROM prompt and select cmpu.pkg.bin.

- [MROM] loady 1f2000 1000 bin

To download the DMPU binary, run the next command at the MROM prompt and select dmpu.pkg.bin.

- [MROM] loady 1f3000 1000 bin

To write secrets into the OTP memory is implemented in a command in RTOS. Therefore, an RTOS image should be run to provision the secrets in the CMPU and DMPU binaries. The user needs to boot with RTOS. To do so, press the power off/on button, or use the boot command at the MROM prompt. hbk0 and CM keys can be burned into the OTP memory with the below-mentioned command on the [DA16200] prompt in RTOS.

- [DA16200] sys.sprod

When successful, the following message is output:

- Product.CMPU: 0

After the power off/on is pressed, the LCS of the DA16200 will change from CM LCS to DM LCS. hbk1 and DM keys can be burned into the OTP memory with command:

- [DA16200] sys.sprod

When successful, the following message is output:

- Product.DMPU: 0

After the power off/on button is pressed, the LCS of the DA16200 will change from DM LCS to Secure LCS, in which JTAG is disabled and only enabled again with a Debug Certificate. Once completed, the CMPU and DMPU binary in the flash should be deleted for security reasons. Command sys.sprod will erase the binaries on the flash.

- [DA16200] sys.sprod

Command sys.sprod will output some messages similar to that shown in Table 17.

Table 17: The Success Message to Change from DM to Secure LCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CC_BsvSocIDCompute return SocID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7D D2 00 E0 F1 06 43 F5 AF 5A 17 3F BF A6 8E 3D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 4C B7 DA AA 6D DB 39 51 0B F5 D5 62 7E 2C 8F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Product.CMPU: Erased
Product.DMPU: Erased
Product.SLock: 1
Product.State: Secure Boot Scenario - Good
The example shows the SoC ID of the device (it will be different from your device) and the status of the CMPU and DMPU binary (whether they are erased or not). Command **Product SLock** shows the status of a control bit in the OTP. If the value is 1, then the DA16200 performs a secure boot.

After all the above-mentioned procedures are completed, the production version of UEboot should be replaced with a normal version of UEboot (rename "DA16xxx_ueboot.bin.NoneSecure" to "DA16xxx_ueboot.bin" in the "image" directory and build the SDK) with the following command at the MROM prompt to download the image.

- **[MROM] loady boot**

The following table summarizes which directories are the most important ones after Secure Production and that should not be exposed for any reason because of security.

**Table 18: The Directory Definition for Secure Production**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>What is in there</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmsecret</td>
<td>CM private keys and encryption keys (private/public key pair, Kceicv, and Kpicv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cmpublic</td>
<td>1st and 2nd certificate for Secure Boot and Secure Debug that use Hbk0 (CM root key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmsecret</td>
<td>DM private keys and encryption keys (private/public key pair, Kcp, and Kce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>1st, 2nd and 3rd certificate for Secure Boot and Secure Debug that use Hbk1 (DM root key)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Boot images with the certificate chain based on the above-mentioned keys are generated in the **public** directory.

- **UEboot image (XXUEBOOTXX.img)** built from our SDK contains a bootloader (UEboot) binary
- **RTOS image (XXRTOSXX.img)** built from our SDK contains an RTOS binary
- **SLIB image (XXSLIBXX.img)** built from SDK contains a ram library and TIM binary

If the target device already went through the CMPU and DMPU process as described before, and the above images were downloaded to the Sflash at the proper address, it will boot correctly.

### 3.2 Key Renewal

When one of the 2nd and 3rd private keys is exposed for any reason, those private keys need to be changed with the Key Renewal menu. Be careful and think twice before this menu is used, because after this menu is used, all previously generated 2nd, 3rd private keys and certificates are deleted and regenerated from scratch (Note that RoT (1st private key) cannot be changed).

If you click the **Key Renewal** button in the Security Tool, the confirmation window shown in **Figure 16** displays to prevent that this key renewal action is done by mistake.

![Figure 16: Warning to Prevent Accidental Removal Secret Keys in Key Renewal](https://example.com/figure16.png)
To do the key renewal, select **Yes to All**. The previously generated 2nd and 3rd private keys, and the certificates are deleted and regenerated.

The following table summarizes which directories are updated after key renewal.

**Table 19: The Directory Definition for Key Renewal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>What is in there</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dmsecret</td>
<td>2nd/3rd private keys for Secure Boot and Secure Debug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>1st/2nd/3rd certificates for Secure Boot and Secure Debug that use Hbk1 (DM root key).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmpubkey</td>
<td>2nd/3rd public keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmtmpcfg</td>
<td>Configurations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public</td>
<td>Images with the certificate chain for Secure Boot.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Boot images with the certificate chain based on the renewed keys are generated in the **public** directory.

- UEboot image (XXUEBOOTXX.img) contains a bootloader (UEboot) binary
- RTOS image (XXRTOSXX.img) contains RTOS binary
- SLIB image (XXSLIBXX.img) contains a ram library and a TIM binary

The file **key_renewal.txt** in the **example** directory is a log file for the Key Renewal process. The file can be used to check the log or read error messages that occurred.

### 3.3 Secure Boot

After running the Secure Debug menu, the generated image contains a Debug Certificate but no Content Certificate chain. See Figure 17.

---

**Figure 17: Debug Certificate of Secure Debug Menu**

For Secure Boot, an image with a Content Certificate chain is required without a Debug certificate.

To generate images for Secure Boot, run the menu item **Secure Boot**. Secure Boot images with the certificate chain are generated in the **public** directory.

- UEboot image (XXUEBOOTXX.img) contains a bootloader (UEboot) binary
3.4 Secure Debug

The debug port in the DA16200 JTAG is disabled by default when entered into Secure LCS as described before. When this debug port needs to be re-enabled for debug purposes, then a Secure Debug image should be used. There is an optional Debug certificate field in an image as described before.

At the boot sequence, a check is done to see whether the Debug certificate exists in the image. If a Debug certificate exists, then the SoC ID in the Debug certificate is checked to see if it matches with the target device. When it does match, the debug port is enabled and boot.

When Secure Debug is run in the Security Tool, the window shown in Figure 18 will display to enter the SoC ID of the target device. Use command `sys.socid` in the console to check what the SoC-ID is of the target device.

- `[DA16200] sys.socid`

You can copy the SoC-id from the console command to the window shown in Figure 18 and then click UPDATE.

The following table summarizes which directories are updated from Secure Debug.

### Table 20: Directory Definition for Secure Debug

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>What is in there</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>Developer certificate with the SoC-ID.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 18: Window to Enter SoC ID in Secure Debug](image)
Secure Debug images with the Debug certificate are generated in the public directory.

- UEboot image (XXUEBOOTXX.img) includes a bootloader (UEboot) binary
- RTOS image (XXRTOSXX.img) includes the RTOS binary
- SLIB image (XXSLIBXX.img) includes the ram library and TIM binary

File secure_debug.txt in the example directory is a log file for the Secure Debug process. The file can be used to check the log and read error messages that occurred.

### 3.5 Secure RMA

As described earlier, the LCS of the chip should be changed to RMA-LCS before the chip is sent to the chip maker (i.e. Dialog Semiconductor) for analysis.

A Debug certificate that has an RMA flag enabled (RMA certificate) is required to enter a device into RMA LCS. In addition, to erase secret keys in the OTP memory, a specific UEBoot binary for RMA is required. This UEBoot binary for RMA is provided in the SDK with the name UEbootXXRMAXX.bin. Like Secure Debug, Secure RMA is allowed for a specific device and a SoC-ID is required for the RMA certificate.

When changing to RMA-LCS, secret keys in the OTP memory such as Kpicv, Kceicv, Kcp, and Kce are erased to prevent that the user's secret keys are exposed and the debug port (JTAG) is re-enabled for debugging purposes.

When running Secure RMA, the window in Figure 19 will display to enter the SoC-ID in the RMA certificate for the target device. Copy and paste the SoC-ID from console command `sys.socid` to the Security Tool window and then click **UPDATE**.

![Figure 19: Window to Enter SoC ID in RMA](image)

There are two images with an RMA certificate generated in the public directory: DA16xxx_rma.img and DA16xxx_rma_icv.img. Image DA16xxx_rma.img is for the RMA image with DM keys and will
erase the DM keys in the OTP. Image DA16xxx_rma_icv.img is for the RMA image with CM keys and will erase the CM keys in the OTP.

After UEboot for RMA to the Sflash is updated, do the following steps for the RMA process.

- [MROM] loady boot [RMA version of UEboot]

To run an RMA image with DM keys, run the following command at the MROM prompt and download DA16xxx_rma.img.

- [MROM] loady 1f2000 1000 bin

After download, the hbk1 and DM keys are erased with the following commands at the [DA16200] prompt:

- [MROM] sbrom sflash 1f2000
- Power OFF and ON  // for POR

To run an RMA image with CM keys, run the following command at the MROM prompt and download DA16xxx_rma_icv.img.

- [MROM] loady 1f2000 1000 bin

After download, the hbk1 and DM keys are erased with the following commands at the [DA16200] prompt:

- [MROM] sbrom sflash 1f2000
- Power OFF and ON  // for POR

To check if the device entered properly into RMA, use command `sys.socid`.

After the above steps are done, the normal version UEBoot image should be in place again on the Sflash.

- [MROM] loady boot [Normal version of UEboot]

Table 21 summarizes which directories are updated from Secure RMA.

Table 21: The directory definition for Secure RMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>What is there</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmpublic</td>
<td>Debug certificate with RMA enabled (RMA certificate) with CM key chain (Hbk0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>Debug certificate with RMA enabled (RMA certificate) with DM key chain (Hbk1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public</td>
<td>Images with RMA certificate with both DM key chain and CM key chain (DA16xxx_rma.img and DA16xxx_rma_icv.img).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

File `secure_rma.txt` in the `example` directory is a log file for the Secure RMA process. The file can be used to check the log and read error messages that occurred.

### 3.6 Remove Secrets

When the user wants to have a 3rd party (or developer) debug the end-product in the field, the user should run menu Remove Secrets before the SBOOT directory is delivered to the 3rd party (or developer), to remove all important secret keys and certificates. Note that before running this menu, the original SBOOT directory should be already backed-up in a safe location because all secret keys...
will be removed. Then, the 3rd party (or developer) can make its own debug images with the SBOOT and IAR environment.

After debugging is done by the 3rd party (or developer), the user should apply the resolving patch codes from the 3rd party to the SDK and build the SDK with IAR, which makes UEboot, RTOS and SLIB binaries that are copied to the \texttt{image} directory.

When you use the Remove Secrets menu, a confirmation window shows. See Figure 20.

Figure 20: Warning to Prevent Unwanted Removal of Secret Keys in Secure RMA

Select \textbf{Yes to All} if you are sure that you want to remove all secrets. Next, the window in Figure 21 shows.

Figure 21: Remove Secret Keys in Secure RMA

This is to determine to whom SBOOT will be sent and what files should be removed accordingly.

Files that will be removed according to the selected target are summarized in Table 22.

Table 22: Directory Definition to Remove Secret Keys in Secure RMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Removed files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SB Publisher</td>
<td>cmsecret</td>
<td>All files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cmpublic</td>
<td>All files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dmsecret</td>
<td>All files except dmpublisher_keypair.pem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>enc.kce.bin, enc.kcp.bin, and all sdebug_ * files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB/SD Publisher</td>
<td>cmsecret</td>
<td>All files</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After this, SBOOT can be sent to the 3rd party (or developer) for debugging or development purposes.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmppublic</td>
<td>All files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmsecret</td>
<td>All files except dmpublisher_keypair.pem, dmdeveloper_keypair.pem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dmpublic</td>
<td>enc.kce.bin, enc.kcp.bin, sdebug_hbk1_enabler_rma_pkg.bin, sdebug_hbk1_developer_rma_pkg.bin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DA16200 Security Tool

Revision History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15-May-2020</td>
<td>Update User Manual for Security Tool v2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>21-04-2020</td>
<td>Add 3.3.6 Remove CMPU and DMPU Binary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>16-Dec-2019</td>
<td>Add Write CM and DM package at Sflash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Add Change Life Cycle Status (LCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Add Change to secure boot mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16-Dec-2019</td>
<td>Editorial review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11-Sept-2019</td>
<td>Update 3.2 How to generate and burn secret keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>03-Jul-2019</td>
<td>Preliminary DRAFT Release</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Status Definitions

**Status** | **Definition**
--- | ---
DRAFT | The content of this document is under review and subject to formal approval, which may result in modifications or additions.
APPROVED or unmarked | The content of this document has been approved for publication.

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