

Application Note Tamper Detector AN-CM-313

Abstract

This application note describes a tamper detector design using the SLG46811 IC as an emulated SPI master to drive Dialog's AT45DB161E Flash memory



Contents

Αb	stract		1
Co	ntents	S	2
Fiç	gures.		2
Та	bles		3
1	Term	s and Definitions	4
2	Refe	rences	4
3	Intro	duction	5
4		piple	
5		nal Blocks Configuration	
•	5.1	MS ACMP Configuration	
	5.2	Oscillator Configuration	
	5.3	EPG Configuration and Data	
	5.4	LUTs Configurations 1	
	5.5	DFFs Configurations 1	
	5.6	Filter / Edge Detector Configuration1	2
	5.7	CNT/DLY0 Configuration	2
	5.8	P DLY Configuration1	2
	5.9	IO Pins Configurations 1	3
	5.10	I ² C Macrocell Configuration	3
6	Desi	gn Verification Using Hardware Prototype1	3
7	Conc	:lusions1	4
8	Furth	ner Considerations1	4
Re	vision	ı History 1	5
Fi	igure	es	
		Tamper Detector Basic Structure	
			5
Fig			
Fig	gure 2: gure 3:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector	6 7
Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector	6 7 7
Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector	6 7 7 8
Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector. Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration	6 7 8 8 9
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector. Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software. MS ACMP Configuration. Oscillator1 Configuration. EPG Configuration EPG Waveform LUTs Configurations.	6 7 8 8 9 0
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7: gure 8: gure 9:	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector. Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration	6 7 8 8 9 0 1
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7: gure 8: gure 9: gure 10	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector. Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration	677889012
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7: gure 8: gure 9: gure 10 gure 11	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration Oscillator1 Configuration EPG Configuration EPG Waveform LUTs Configurations	6778890122 2
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7: gure 8: gure 9: gure 10 gure 11 gure 12	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration Oscillator1 Configuration EPG Configuration EPG Waveform LUTs Configurations	677889012223
Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig Fig	gure 2: gure 3: gure 4: gure 5: gure 6: gure 7: gure 8: gure 9: gure 10 gure 11 gure 12 gure 13	Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software MS ACMP Configuration Oscillator1 Configuration EPG Configuration EPG Waveform LUTs Configurations	6778890122233

AN-CM-313



Tamper Detector



Terms and Definitions

DFF D flip flop

DI w/o ST Digital input without Schmidt trigger

EPG Extended pattern generator

IC Integrated Circuit

I2C Inter-integrated circuit (bus)

MS ACMP Multichannel Sampling Analog Comparator

OE Output Enable SHR Shift register

SPI Serial peripheral interface

1 References

- [1] SLG46811, Datasheet, Dialog Semiconductor
- [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DataFlash



2 Introduction

Tamper detection is a function widely used within critical infrastructure systems such as power meters, water meters, security and fire panels, and any other products where a trigger input needs to be detected and the event recorded in non-volatile memory (Flash memory). The SLG46811 GreenPAK mixed-signal IC is ideally suited for this tamper-detection role when paired with the AT45DB161E Flash memory for recording the event.

3 Principle

Figure 1 shows the basic design of the tamper detector. The devices with low pin-count serial Data Flash® interface [2] are the easiest to set up for a tamper detector as we can use the page erase and page write as one instruction while bypassing the Write Enable signal of the Flash before said command => one command Byte, 3 address Bytes and data Bytes (Figure 2 and Table 1). 0x82 is the command to program Main Memory Page through Buffer 1 with Built-In Erase.

CS, MOSI, and CLK pins are configured as Push Pull. Trigger sources that force SLG46811 to write data to flash memory are:

- external signal from GPIO;
- ACMP with low Vdd level detection. When Vdd < 3V, Trigger #1 occurs.

SLG46811 can operate with flash memory if enable EN input is HIGH.




Figure 1: Tamper Detector Basic Structure






Figure 2: Timing Diagram of Tamper Detector

Table 1: MOSI (SLG46811 as a master, Flash memory as a slave)

EPG OUTX	CMD	Addr	Addr	Addr	Data
EPG OUT0	0x82	F1	00	00	5A
EPG OUT1	0x82	F1	40	00	A5

The SLG46811 design (Figure 3) sets up the Extended Pattern Generator as a SPI master to generate the command sequence and the specific data for the trigger. While the signal at PIN10 (Trigger #2) goes HIGH and the signal at PIN2 (EN) is HIGH, a LOW-level signal is generated at PIN5 (CS). While CS is LOW the CLK signal is generated at PIN11 (CLK) to clock the command sequence out at PIN12 (MOSI).

DFF9 and DFF5 are used to generate a pulse passing through 4-bit LUT0 and 2-bit LUT2 to trigger one-shot (CNT0). A LOW level of the one-shot generates the CS signal (PIN5). Similarly, the Under-Voltage sequence is generated at MOSI when Vdd drops below the MS ACMP voltage reference.

When Vdd drops below the comparator voltage reference, DFF12 and DFF8 generate a pulse to the 4-bit LUT0, just as with Trigger #2.

DFF3 serves as a frequency divide by 2. DFF2 serves as CLK at PIN11 delayed by 1 clock pulse after CS signal. After data transition the PDLY and 2-bit LUT0 are used to set DFF2 (to 0), and 2-bit LUT1 used to reset DFF3 (to initial value) and EPG (to initial value).

3-bit LUT4, 3-bit LUT9 and 3-bit LUT12 are used for muxing EPG outputs according to trigger conditions.

EPG is used to store pre-programed data. EPG OUT0 generates data while Vdd voltage goes below threshold, and OUT1 generates data relative to the input pulse (at PIN10).

EPG can retain up to 92 bits of pre-programmed data for each output. To change the transaction data size it is necessary to set the CNT0 data (but CNT0 data cannot be more than 92).






Figure 3: Internal Design of tamper detector based on SLG46811 in GreenPAK Designer Software

4 Internal Blocks Configuration

4.1 MS ACMP Configuration



Figure 4: MS ACMP Configuration



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Tamper Detector

4.2 Oscillator Configuration




Figure 5: Oscillator1 Configuration

4.3 EPG Configuration and Data




Figure 6: EPG Configuration





Figure 7: EPG Waveform



4.4 LUTs Configurations



Figure 8: LUTs Configurations



4.5 DFFs Configurations




Figure 9: DFFs Configurations



4.6 Filter / Edge Detector Configuration



Figure 10: Filter / Edge Detector Configuration

4.7 CNT/DLY0 Configuration



Figure 11: CNT/DLY0 (MF0) Configuration

4.8 P DLY Configuration




Figure 12: P DLY Configuration



4.9 IO Pins Configurations



Figure 13: IO Pins Configurations

4.10 I²C Macrocell Configuration

I²C Macrocell uses default settings.

5 Design Verification Using Hardware Prototype

The design was tested in hardware (SLG46811 + AT45DB161 flash), and **Error! Reference source not found.** - Figure 16 show the waveforms sent to the flash memory while hardware prototyping.




Figure 14: EPG OUT0. Data = 5Ah to be stored in Flash Memory

Application Note Revision 1.0 15-Mar-2021






Figure 15: Zoomed EPG OUT0




Figure 16: EPG OUT1. Data = A5h to be stored in Flash

7 Conclusions

Dialog SLG46811 is a great solution for the development of a simple SPI master to drive flash memory. As usual with the GreenPAK family of products, the tamper and fault detection implementation described in this application is just one of many ways to perform this implementation. Additional advantages of "GreenPAK + AT45DB161E memory implementation" are quick design time, high level of configurability, low power consumption, small board area, and low cost.

8 Further Considerations

This design could be further enhanced by driving the Output pins to the Flash memory as Tristate when the EN input is driven low. This would allow a host microcontroller to access the Flash to read the Last Trigger results and to use the Flash for general storage. The host micro would need to tristate its CLK, MOSI and /CS pins when it drives the EN pin is high.



Revision History

Revision	Date	Description
1.0	15-Mar-2021	Initial version.



Status Definitions

Status	Definition	
DRAFT	The content of this document is under review and subject to formal approval, which may result in modifications or additions.	
APPROVED or unmarked	The content of this document has been approved for publication.	

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